What an RDP file is

A text file of connection settings. Harmless in itself, and a standard attack, which is why mail removes it.

The file is a plain text list of connection settings. Everything about how it is treated comes from how effectively it is abused.

An RDP file opened in a text editor showing its settings.
An RDP file opened in a text editor showing its settings.

What is inside

Readable lines: the address of the machine to connect to, the window size, the colour depth, the username, and which local resources are shared with the remote side.

Open one in a text editor and you can read all of it. There is nothing hidden and no code.

Setting What it controls
Full address Which machine you connect to
Username Who you connect as
Drive redirection Whether your files are shared
Clipboard redirection Whether copy and paste crosses
Display settings Window size, colour

Why mail systems strip them

Because sending one is a standard phishing technique, at scale.

A convincing message, a file attached, and opening it connects the recipient to a machine the attacker controls. From there the attacker collects credentials or, if drive sharing is enabled in the file, reaches into the recipient's own files.

Mail systems block them as a category. Many do so silently, which is why a colleague sometimes says nothing arrived.

The two settings that matter

Where it connects. Set in the file by whoever made it. Read it before opening.

What gets shared. Drive and clipboard redirection are convenient internally and are precisely what an attacker wants enabled. A file from outside enabling both is the whole attack.

Checking those two lines takes ten seconds and is the difference between routine and compromised.

Connection details published as text on an internal page.
Connection details published as text on an internal page.

What to send instead

The details as text, on a page.

The machine address, the username format, the settings to choose, and a short explanation of what the connection is for. The colleague creates the connection themselves, which takes a minute.

The minute is worth it. It gets past mail filters, and it makes the person look at what they are connecting to rather than double-clicking something that arrived.

Put it on an internal page with the rest of your access documentation, so there is one place to look and one place to correct.

The better arrangement

A browser-based remote access gateway.

Nothing is sent, access is granted centrally, sessions are logged, and access can be revoked when somebody leaves. It removes the file entirely, along with the category of problem attached to it.

For any organisation doing this regularly, it is the answer rather than better habits around attachments.

Closely related: What to do when an attachment is too large, and Securing a small website for the adjacent problem.

Put it at an address

Open one in a text editor before trusting it, never open one that arrived unexpectedly, check the destination and the sharing settings, publish connection details as text on a page, and move to a gateway for anything regular.

Questions people ask

What is in one?

Plain text settings: which machine to connect to, the display size, and which local resources to share. Open it in a text editor and read it.

Why does email strip them?

Because sending one is a standard phishing technique. Opening a malicious file connects the recipient to an attacker’s machine.

How can it be dangerous if it is just settings?

Settings decide what gets shared with the remote machine, including local drives and the clipboard. The destination is also attacker-controlled.

What should I send instead?

The connection details as text on a page, with instructions. The colleague types them in, which also makes them check what they are connecting to.

Is there a safer way entirely?

A browser-based remote access gateway. Nothing to send, access is controlled centrally, and it can be revoked.

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